WHEN IS EMPLOYEE BLOGGING PROTECTED
BY SECTION 7 OF THE NLRA?
KATHERINE M. SCOTT 1

ABSTRACT
The National Labor Relations Act forbids employers from
retaliating against certain types of employee speech or intimidating
those who engage in it. This iBrief examines how blogging fits into
the current statutory framework and recommends how the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts should address the unique
features of employee blogs.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Blogging has tremendous potential to shift the balance of power
from employers to employees, as employees gain the ability to
communicate their concerns to other employees, customers, neighbors,
stockholders, and other parties interested in the employer. 2 While many
businesses already communicate with the public through well-organized,
well-funded marketing and public relations departments, employees now
have an inexpensive way to get their own messages out to the public—a
factor of rising importance in modern labor disputes. 3 While employers can
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J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2007; M.S. in Industrial
Engineering and Operations Research, The Pennsylvania State University, 1999;
B.S. in Mathematical Sciences, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1997.
The author would like to thank Professor Catherine Fisk for her advice and
encouragement, and Sylvia Winston, Chin Pann and the other DLTR editors for
very helpful and constructive writing suggestions.
2
See, e.g., Doug Tsuruoka, AOL Blogging Site Gathers Information on Popular
Stocks, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 17, 2006, at A06 (describing a new
website that tracks employee blogs to help investors evaluate stocks); EDELMAN
& INTELLISEEK, TALKING FROM THE INSIDE OUT: THE RISE OF EMPLOYEE
BLOGGERS 3 (2005), http://www.edelman.com/image/insights/content/EdelmanIntelliseek%20Employee%20Blogging%20White%20Paper.pdf (“The rise of
the blogosphere has the potential to empower employees in ways not unlike the
rise of labor unions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.”); W-WAssociates,
Welcome, http://groups.msn.com/W-WAssociates/welcome.msnw (last visited
Sept. 24, 2006) (“Customers are more than welcome here.”).
3
See Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73
B.U. L. REV. 293, 294 (1993) (referring to “today’s corporate campaign, in
which employees and their unions relentlessly advance by verbal warfare on the
target employer and its agents for the purpose of enlisting the public as allies in
their cause”).
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already send messages to employees through their own communication
channels, employees now have a new means of discussing issues with each
other, regardless of the obstacles presented by differently-timed shifts,
physically separated workplaces, and the operational demands of work.
¶2
Blogs allow an unprecedented visibility, participation, and volume
of communication. A blogger can reach members of the public who do not
visit the employer’s business or walk by a protest. Also, a blogger can
communicate with co-employees in different work locations4 and even with
employees of other employers 5 without having to obtain their contact
information. The information posted on a blog can come from multiple
sources because readers often post comments, 6 and large amounts of text
and links to other sites make detailed information more accessible. Anyone
reading the blog can see the factual support for or interest in any idea that is
posted. Finally, the anonymity of the Internet allows employees to explore
information about a labor dispute and test the waters without having to
reveal their identities. 7
¶3
As blogging has grown in popularity, employer concern about
blogging has grown, and some employees have already been fired for their
blogs. 8 Employees can disclose trade secrets, 9 confidential financial
4

See, e.g., W-WAssociates.com, supra note 2 (“If you are a Wal-Mart/Sam’s
Club associate or former associate then this is the place for you to come and
share your good and bad experiences about Wal-Mart.”).
5
See, e.g., Washtech.org, Washington Alliance of Technology Workers,
http://www.washtech.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2006) (“From Silicon Valley to
Boston, high-tech workers are joining our national network-to raise our voice
and make a difference.”).
6
See Mark Glaser, What Really Makes a Blog Shine, in REPORTERS WITHOUT
BORDERS, HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 33, 34 (2005),
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf.
7
See Alison Young, CDC Will Examine Fairness of Bonuses, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 19, 2006, at 1A, available at
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/atlanta/stories/2006/09/18/0919cdccas
h.html (referring to anonymous employee postings on the cdcchatter.net blog in
reference to allegations of improper cash bonus awards to certain employees at
the Centers for Disease Control, including a post calling upon “employees and
others . . . to voice our utter disgust and stop this corruption”); cf. Snap-On
Tools, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,708, 2004
NLRB LEXIS 314, at *33–*34 (2004) (finding an unfair labor practice when an
employer focused a surveillance camera on handbillers, which “prevented
employees who desired to receive union literature anonymously from doing
so”).
8
See, e.g., PROOFPOINT, OUTBOUND EMAIL AND CONTENT SECURITY IN
TODAY’S ENTERPRISE 2 (2006) (revealing that 7.1 percent of the large U.S.
companies surveyed had fired at least one employee for violating blog or
message board policies in the past year), cited in Del Jones, Sun CEO Sees
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information, 10 or other internal documents; 11 put the employer in an
embarrassing light by abusing its trademarks, 12 or projecting a negative or
otherwise unprofessional attitude; 13 disrupt the workplace with public
comments about other employees; 14 or offend the employer’s customers by
making racist, sexist, or otherwise inappropriate remarks. 15
¶4
Despite these concerns, various laws limit an employer’s control
over what employees write, especially outside of working hours. 16 One
such law is the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which protects

Competitive Advantage in Blogging, USA TODAY, June 26, 2006, at 7B;
EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 12–13; Carson Strege-Flora, Wait!
Don’t Fire That Blogger! What Limits Does Labor Law Impose on Employer
Regulation of Employee Blogs?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 11, ¶ 4 (Dec. 16,
2005), http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a011Strege.html; Konrad
Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the
Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity Before Service of
Process is Effected, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0002, ¶¶ 20–22 (Jan. 17,
2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2006DLTR0002.pdf.
9
John P. Hutchins, Beyond the Water Cooler: Does Corporate Blogging
Change the Legal Landscape?, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 14, 2005, at 45, 46.
10
Id.; Ephraim Schwartz, Bloggers and the Law, INFOWORLD, May 3, 2005,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/05/03/19OPreality_1.html.
11
See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney, 1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 3 (Feb. 10, 1999),
available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/l021099_pratt19753.as
p (relating that employee posted internal memorandum on his website).
12
See, e.g., EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13 (recounting that a
flight attendant was fired for posting a picture of herself “in uniform . . . with
her blouse unbuttoned far wider than the company’s dress code specified”).
13
See, e.g., Colin Randall, Wrote Blog and Got the Sack. V Bad. Will Sue.,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 18, 2006, International, at 17 (describing the firing of a
secretary who wrote a “Bridget Jones in Paris” blog about her work at an
accounting firm); Fthisjob.com, http://www.fthisjob.com/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2006) (“Welcome to fthisjob.com, the ‘I hate my job’ blogging community.”).
14
Sarah Vos & Jamie Gumbrecht, Web Sites Personal, but Millions See Them,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Kentucky), Mar. 30, 2006, at A1 (“[A] California
auto club fired 27 people for comments made about other employees’ weight
and sexual orientation.”).
15
See, e.g., Richard Wray, “Lefty Lexicon” Lands Orange Executive in Big
Trouble, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 17, 2006, at 13 (noting the suspension of a
community affairs manager for posting anti-Islamic remarks); Employee Blogs,
ADVANCE NEWS MAGAZINES FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS, Nov. 1, 2005,
available at http://nursepractitioners.advanceweb.com/common/editorial/PrintFriendly.aspx?CC=62666.
16
See, e.g., id.; Lee, supra note 8, at n.46 (referring to whistleblower
protections).
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certain activities by non-supervisory private sector employees. 17
Specifically, section 7 of the NLRA protects “the right . . . to form, join, or
assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 18
Employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of” their section 7 rights. 19 These provisions likely extend to
employee blogs under certain circumstances. 20
¶5
Blogs present courts with a new context in which to strike the
balance between employee and employer rights. This iBrief focuses on
employee blogging during personal time without the aid of an employer’s
property. The iBrief recommends that courts recognize employees’
criticisms of their employer on blogs as protected concerted activity, and
argues that existing case law examining unfair labor practices readily
applies to the blogging context.

I. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
A. What Kind of Activities Are Protected?
¶6
The NLRA protects “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection” 21 by most private-sector, non-supervisory employees. 22 These
protections apply in unionized and non-unionized workplaces; no union or
organizing campaign is necessary. 23 This section will summarize the basic
law describing when employee activities are protected under section 7 of
the NLRA.

17

29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 160(a) (2000); see also Brian Christensen & David M.
Kight, Section 7 and the Non-Union Employer, 60 J. MO. B. 312, 312 & nn.6–7
(2004).
18
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
19
Id. § 158(a).
20
See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Blogger’s FAQ: Labor Law,
http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-labor.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2006); Lee,
supra note 8, at n.47; Strege-Flora, supra note 8; see also W-WAssociates,
http://groups.msn.com/W-WAssociates/disclaimerlegalpage.msnw (informing
Wal-Mart employees they are protected if they “are posting honestly what is
going on at [their] store about [their] working conditions”) (last visited Sept. 24,
2006).
21
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
22
Id. § 152(2) (excluding federal, state, and municipal governments and unions
from the definition of “employer”); id. § 152(3) (excluding “any individual
employed as a supervisor” from the definition of “employee”).
23
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948).
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1. What is Concerted Activity?
¶7
For an employee’s action to be “concerted,” he or she must act
with, or as authorized by, other employees. 24 The “definition of concerted
activity . . . encompasses those circumstances where individual employees
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action,” 25 sometimes
including situations when an employee implies, but does not expressly state,
a request for other employees to act. 26 Concertedness also exists when an
employee’s action is a “logical outgrowth” of previous group activity. 27
2. What is Mutual Aid or Protection?
¶8
Concerted activities are protected only when done “for mutual aid
or protection.” 28 Historically, this has meant a “self-interested economic
objective” 29 such as improved pay, hours, safety, or workload, rather than
concerns such as product quality 30 or environmental damage. 31 However,
24

See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1288 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he relevant question is whether the employee acted with the purpose of
furthering group goals.”), quoted in William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor
Law of the Twenty-First Century, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 292
(2002); see also Int’l Transp. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160, 166 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (denying protection to an employee who picketed for a one-person
bargaining unit); NLRB v. Hotel Employees Int’l Union Local 26, 446 F.3d 200,
207 (1st Cir. 2006) (“To qualify as concerted activity, ‘[i]t is sufficient that the
[complaining] employee intends or contemplates, as an end result, group activity
which will also benefit some other employees.’” (quoting Koch Supplies, Inc. v.
NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1981)).
25
Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
26
Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247–48 (1997) (finding that an
employee’s email to his coworkers about a proposed change in company
vacation policy to be concerted activity because he “was attempting to correct
any misimpression . . . and to arouse support for his own decision to oppose the
proposal”); see also Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 17-CA-21603, 2002 NLRB
LEXIS 485, at *27 (Sept. 30, 2002) (holding employee’s warning about anthrax
risk in the workplace to be concerted), aff’d 339 N.L.R.B. 1012 (2003).
27
Every Woman’s Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 413, 413 (1986) (finding
employee’s call to Department of Labor was concerted because she and her coworkers had already brought their concern to management’s attention at least
four times); see also Five Star Transp., Inc., No. 1-CA-41158, 2004 NLRB
LEXIS 329, at *21 (June 23, 2004), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD-60-04.pdf (finding that
letters written by individual employees were a “logical outgrowth” of an earlier
meeting).
28
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
29
Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interest, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 928 (1992); see also Corbett, supra note 24, at 282–83.
30
Estlund, supra note 29, at 949.
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courts sometimes look broadly at employee motives to find self interest
even when concerns for customers, neighbors, or other employers’ workers
also exist and even predominate within the communication. 32
3. Exceptions to NLRA Protections
¶9
“[E]mployee communications to third parties in an effort to obtain
their support are protected where the communication indicate[s] it is related
to an ongoing dispute . . . and the communication is not so disloyal, reckless
or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” 33 Though the
meaning of “disloyalty” is hotly debated, 34 certain categories of speech
have emerged as being unprotected: (1) remarks that disparage the
employer or its products, 35 (2) confidentiality breaches 36 and (3) recklessly
or maliciously false accusations. 37
¶10
Courts have applied different tests to determine when negative
remarks about the employer or its products fall under section 7’s
disparagement exception. In general, disparaging “appeals to third parties
forfeit [section] 7 protection only if their connection to the employees’
working conditions is too attenuated or if they are unrelated to any

31

See id. at 956. Estlund provides a powerful critique of the historically narrow
construction of “mutual aid or protection” based on the legislative history of the
Wagner Act, the realities of modern work, and the public interest. See id. at
942–67.
32
See, e.g., Five Star, No. 1-CA-41158, 2004 NLRB LEXIS at *11, *25–*26
(holding that school bus drivers whose letters expressed concern for children’s
safety were protected, so long as their letters also expressed concern for the bus
drivers’ own wages and job security); Estlund, supra note 29, at 927–28, 936–
38.
33
Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000). The case widely cited as
establishing the disloyalty exception is NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), in which a broadcasting station’s
employees were unprotected when they passed out a handbill criticizing their
employer’s programming. See, e.g., Branscomb, supra note 3, at 300–01.
34
See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1989);
Branscomb, supra note 3, at 295.
35
1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 211 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr.
eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
36
Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in
Traditional and Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 855 (2003); 1
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 207
37
1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 210; see, e.g., TNT Logistics N.
Am., Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 287, at *7–*8 (July 24,
2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/347/34755.pdf.
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grievance which the workers may have.” 38 Although the tenor of the
language seems to be a factor in the analysis,39 several Courts of Appeals
and the NLRB have found employee speech protected even when that
speech uses harsh language. 40 The D.C. Circuit, however, recently held that
an employee’s remarks lost the protection of section 7 when those remarks,
which supported a union and protested recent layoffs, “constituted ‘a sharp,
public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s product and its
business policies’ at a ‘critical time’ for the company.” 41
¶11
The scope and rationale of the disparagement exception is unclear.
Some courts seem to believe that only managers, and not employees, have a
legitimate interest in product quality and the employer’s impact on the
community. 42 Under that interpretation, any criticism must be framed as a
concern about working conditions to be protected. 43 Another theory
suggests that the exception arises from fear that employees will deceive the

38

Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 216 (citing examples); accord Am. Golf Corp.,
330 N.L.R.B. at 1241 (finding unprotected an employee’s handbill suggesting
that the town hire a different contractor because it did not mention the
employee’s labor dispute with the contractor).
39
See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 217 (“[D]espite the criticisms voiced
in the [employees’] letter, the tone was both constructive and hopeful.”).
40
See, e.g., id. at 218 (citing examples); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 834
(1987) (finding that when employees said to their employer’s client that the
employer was “no damn good” and “couldn’t finish the job,” the employees
were engaged in protected activity because they were explaining their strike to
protest the fact they had not been paid for five months).
41
Endicott Interconnect Techs. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464,
471 (1953)) (holding the employee’s remarks unprotected when he cast doubt on
the struggling manufacturer’s continuing business viability, writing that the
business was being “tanked” and its managers were going to “put it into the
dirt”), rev’g 345 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,971,
2005 NLRB LEXIS 443, at *20 (Aug. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/345/345-28.pdf (holding that an
employer’s “sensitivity to the possible impact” of an employee’s remarks does
not “serve to limit [an employee’s] statutory right to appeal to the public”).
42
See Estlund, supra note 29, at 949 (“Current doctrine is based on the premise
that employees are not advancing their interests as employees when they
criticize their employer’s products or services.”); see also id. at 930 (discussing
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), in
which a handbill criticizing only the quality of the employer’s television and
radio programming was unprotected).
43
See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 220 (“[S]uggestions that a company’s
treatment of its employees may have an effect upon the quality of the company’s
products, or may even affect the company’s own viability” may be protected.).
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public into exerting economic pressure on their employer. 44 Therefore, a
court may find unrelated product criticisms protected as long as the
communication also reveals the employees’ dispute with their employer. 45
Breaches of confidentiality are another category of unprotected
communication. Although employees cannot be prohibited from discussing
their own working conditions, 46 they are not protected when disseminating
information obtained in confidence or without authorization, even when it
concerns terms and conditions of employment. 47
¶12

¶13
False statements remain protected as long as the employee making
the statements does so neither knowingly nor recklessly. 48 An employee
who has no reason to question the information that he or she merely passes
along from someone else has no duty to investigate its truthfulness because
such a duty would unacceptably chill employee speech under section 7. 49
Yet employees have no right under the NLRA to propagate lies knowingly
or recklessly. 50 Therefore, an overly excited employee who spreads
44

See Estlund, supra note 29, at 981 (“Objections to the purely tactical use of
product disparagement and other ‘public-oriented’ criticism of the employer of
the sort illustrated by Jefferson Standard [346 U.S. 464] may reflect as well a
fear that the public may be unfairly duped into supporting labor’s cause.”).
45
See Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 217 (“[T]hird parties who receive appeals
for support in a labor dispute will filter the information critically so long as they
are aware it is generated out of that context.”), quoted in Estlund, supra note 29,
at 935 n.74.
46
See, e.g., King, supra note 36, at 857–59 (describing, inter alia, Kinder-Care
Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1176 (1990) (daycare working
conditions) and Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510, 510 (2002) (sexual
harassment complaints)); see also Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social
Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 43 n.14 (2005)
(listing cases discussing wage confidentiality policies).
47
See NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (wage
data stolen from supervisor’s office); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824,
826 (1998) (“hotel-private” information such as “guest information, trade
secrets, [and] contracts with suppliers”).
48
See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 883 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Federal labor law protects even false and defamatory statements unless such
statements are made with actual malice—i.e., knowledge of falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth.” (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281 (1974) and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383
U.S. 53, 61 (1966))).
49
See KBO, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 570, 571 & n.6 (1994) (holding that an
employee who “relay[ed] to [other employees] in good faith what he had been
told” by another employee was protected by section 7, even though the
information turned out to be false).
50
See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1012 n.2 (2003);
KBO, 315 N.L.R.B. at 570.
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harmful and sensitive rumors that he or she should know are false will not
be protected. 51

B. How Courts Should Construe Protection of Blogging
¶14
For blogging to be protected as section 7 activity, it must be
concerted, for mutual aid or protection, and not within one of the exceptions
discussed above. This section of the iBrief addresses how such standards
should apply to blogs, finding considerable room to treat some blogging as
a “concerted activity,” endorsing a broad scope for “mutual aid or
protection,” and recommending that courts evaluate a blog as a whole,
rather than post by post, when deciding whether statements on the blog are
protected under the NLRA.

When evaluating concertedness, courts should continue to apply a
broad standard, so that blogs where employees discuss work concerns meet
this initial threshold criterion for protection. Certainly, if multiple
employees create a draft together with the intent of posting it, then their
activity is literally and obviously concerted,52 and if two or more employees
have been complaining about particular working conditions and one alerts
the public by blogging about it, then this is a “logical outgrowth” of
concerted activity. In addition, an employee who posts without previously
consulting his co-workers could be seen as initiating group action by
inviting his co-workers to share their concerns. 53 The presence of a
comment feature on most blogs arguably implicitly invites others to
participate in the discussion, but to find a blog protected, a court should
have to find that the blog at least implies that co-employees are the intended
¶15

51

Although a nurse’s televised statements that hospital policies endangered
patients did not spring from “an evil motive,” they were unprotected because
they were “materially false and misleading” and “made her continued
employment untenable” due to her co-workers’ outrage. Id. at 578–82; see also
Sprint, 339 N.L.R.B. at 1015–16, 1018–19 (finding email warning co-workers of
anthrax unprotected because sender was reckless with respect to the truth or
falsity of three claims and “fabricated” two others).
52
See Ogihara Am. Corp., No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555, at *10,
*42 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD-80-05.pdf (finding that
an employee’s sending of a letter he composed with feedback from other
employees was concerted).
53
See Strege-Flora, supra note 8, ¶ 12.
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audience. 54 The presence of actual comments or links from other
employees’ blogs may also create concertedness. 55
¶16
Unlike the analysis of concertedness, the analysis of the “mutual aid
or protection” requirement does not depend upon the characteristics of
blogging as a medium. How courts interpret the scope of protection will be
critical in practice, though, so two particular issues merit discussion. First,
it is currently unclear whether, outside the union context, distributing
“political” literature about laws affecting working conditions is always
unprotected, or whether the distribution is merely unprotected at the
workplace. 56 Some employee bloggers will probably refer to political
changes affecting their workplaces and include links to or material from
political organizations in support of their position. 57 Such inclusion of
political material, when related to employees’ working conditions, furthers
workers’ mutual aid or protection. 58 Second, courts’ current exclusion of
54

Cf. id. (“[I]f the blogger is promoting the blog to other workers or other
workers are visiting the site, it may then fall under the protection of the
NLRA . . . .”).
55
See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 (1997) (noting that
concerted activity may have been created by another employee’s response to the
initial email, but that the case did not depend on this). Other employees’ visits
to the site may be necessary or even sufficient for concertedness. See StregeFlora, supra note 8, ¶ 12.
56
See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569–70, 575 (1978) (finding the
distribution of a union newsletter with political content on employer property
protected because the issues could affect the union’s bargaining position);
NLRB v. Motorola, Inc, 991 F.2d 278, 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying
protection to employees’ onsite distribution of an outside organization’s
literature for a city ordinance against random drug testing of employees
expressing fear of “authoriz[ing] any political splinter group with employee
members to disseminate literature at the workplace as long as the group’s
agenda includes some issue relevant to that workplace”); Bill Hylen, Casenote,
NLRB v. Motorola: A Narrow Interpretation of the “Mutual Aid or Protection”
Clause of the National Labor Relations Act, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 260 (1994)
(criticizing this policy rationale).
57
See Hylen, supra note 56, at 261–62 (noting that Motorola may handicap
corporate campaigns by denying section 7 protection to employees who use
informational literature prepared by outside political advocacy organizations).
Note that even under a very broad view of legitimate employee interests,
discussion of some political issues, such as international military aid and
reproductive rights, would remain unprotected in most workplaces. Estlund,
supra note 29, at 969.
58
See Hylen, supra note 56, at 258 (“The [Motorola] court made a fundamental
error by emphasizing [the anti-drug-testing organization’s] agenda in
distributing literature at Motorola, rather than emphasizing the Motorola
employees’ agenda in distributing literature . . . . The workers were attempting
to achieve ‘mutual aid or protection’ . . . .”).
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concerns such as product quality and the natural environment “reflects an
impoverished understanding of the meaning of work in our lives.” 59
Certainly, an employee may just write negative things to retaliate against a
soon-to-be former employer or to blackmail an employer into making labor
concessions. 60 But at a basic level, many employees want their employer to
prosper so that they will keep their jobs and advance in them. 61 Perhaps
more importantly, it is reasonable to believe many employees want to take
pride in what they do and to be part of an organization with which they feel
morally aligned. 62 As Professor Cynthia Estlund asks rhetorically, “[C]an it
fairly be said, as a categorical matter, that the employer’s toxic
contamination of the surrounding community or the quality of the collective
work product is of less legitimate concern to employees than, for example,
the price of soft drinks in employer-provided vending machines?” 63
Although the interpretation of “mutual aid or protection” does not depend
on the characteristics of blogging, how courts resolve these open issues will
profoundly influence the effectiveness of blogging as a tool for employee
organizing.
¶17
Even with a broad reading of concertedness and “mutual aid or
protection,” the multitude of posts and comments contained on blogs will
present an analytical challenge. On nearly any blog where employees
frankly discuss their jobs, some posts, examined individually, probably
“disparage” the employer or its products without explicitly connecting the
criticism to a labor dispute. Other gripes probably fall outside the scope of
“mutual aid or protection” because they do not reveal the “specific
objective” of changing a particular employment practice. 64 However,
requiring each individual post to meet the standards for protected concerted
activity would certainly chill communication. 65 Instead, if a post at issue
does not meet the “mutual aid or protection” standard or is an instance of
product disparagement, courts should consider the entire blog to evaluate
whether a post is part of a campaign by employees to improve their
employment conditions and whether readers would reasonably understand
that purpose. Such information could be found in the blog’s “About”
section, in a banner at the top of the blog, or in a “critical mass” of posts
59

Estlund, supra note 29, at 926.
See id. at 930 (referring to “tactical” product disparagement).
61
Id. at 949.
62
See id. at 957 (“[E]mployees have a legitimate stake in being part of an
enterprise that does good and not harm.”).
63
Id. at 958.
64
See Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 248.
65
See Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System
of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 167–71 (1993) (describing how
the “hypertechnical nature” of the doctrines associated with section 7 create
“traps for the unwary”).
60

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 17

that would lead a reasonable reader of the site to understand that the blog
presents concerns of employees about their working conditions.
¶18
In summary, there are good reasons to believe that employee blogs
can and should be protected in many instances as concerted activities under
section 7 of the NLRA. In light of that conclusion, blogs raise a number of
special issues for employers, including surveillance, blogging policies, and
anonymity.

II. SPECIAL ISSUES IN NLRA PROTECTION OF BLOGGING
A. Prohibition of Employer Surveillance, Impression of Surveillance,
or Interrogation
¶19
Retaliation and discrimination on the basis of protected activity are
obviously “unfair labor practices” under the NLRA, 66 but other actions also
qualify. Interrogation that has a “coercive effect” when considered in
context is an unfair labor practice. 67 Also, engaging in surveillance of
union or organizing activity or creating the “impression of surveillance” of
that activity is an unfair labor practice under some circumstances because it
can facilitate later unfair labor practices, and if known to employees, it can
intimidate them out of exercising their rights. 68 Although the case law
addresses unions and organizing campaigns, the same rationales should
logically apply to surveillance of other concerted activities.
¶20
The prohibition against surveillance limits how employers can
respond even to activity that occurs in public. For example, in cases where
supervisors spent hours every evening at the village drugstore watching
handbill distribution 69 and where a supervisor abandoned his usual lunch
restaurant to watch employees solicit union members in the cafeteria, 70
courts found unlawful surveillance. These were, however, relatively
extreme cases involving tense union organizing situations. In most

66

See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 244 (ruling that employer
violated the NLRA by firing employee for protected activity).
67
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 475 (2005).
68
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[E]mployer surveillance ‘tends to create fear among employees of future
reprisal’ and, thus, ‘chills an employee’s freedom to exercise’ his rights under
federal labor law.” (quoting Cal. Acrylic Indus. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099
(9th Cir. 1998))); ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 213–14 (2d ed.
2004) (citing Cannon Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1965) and Flexsteel Indus.,
Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257 (1993)).
69
NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir. 1944).
70
NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1956).
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instances when management watches open and public activity, no unfair
labor practice will be found. 71
Far from analogous to eavesdropping on a private conversation, 72
management’s visiting a non-secure blog is more like reading an
advertisement that employees have placed in the local newspaper.
Information deliberately placed on the Internet is meant to be read, and it
would be unreasonable to expect employers not to monitor websites where
they know employees are posting openly and publicly and perhaps exposing
the company to risk.

¶21

¶22
Even when observation is acceptable, however, recording
employees’ section 7 activity can be an unfair labor practice unless the
employer has an objectively reasonable justification for doing so. 73
Therefore, if an employer starts to record the blog’s content each day, it
may need to provide an objectively reasonable justification for doing so.
An employer will likely prevail with its justification if it documents daily
posts to help management piece together the identity of an anonymous
blogger who is spreading false rumors or leaking confidential information.74
If, however, the anonymous blogger has shown no propensity to post
forbidden subject matter, then keeping records of the blog may be
analogous to an employer photographing employee unionizing activities “in
the mere belief that something might happen,” which is not allowed. 75

71

GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 68, at 215 (“[A]n employer is usually free to
observe employees engaging in union or other concerted activity that is engaged
in openly and in public.”).
72
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002)
(comparing management’s infiltration of the employee’s website to an earlier
case involving eavesdropping on a break-room conversation).
73
See Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d at 455. For example, videotaping
peaceful union rallies for three months was held an unfair labor practice because
no valid security interest outweighed the tendency of the cameras to chill
protected activity. Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499, 501–02
(1997), enforced, 156 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In contrast, when picketers
had large dogs and were packed shoulder to shoulder across the doors to the
store, videotaping them and writing down their names was acceptable because
the employer “had a reasonable basis to have anticipated misconduct that
justified” the videotaping. In re Strack & Van Til Supermarkets, 340 N.L.R.B.
No. 172, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶16,621, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 13, at
*24–*25 (2004), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/340/340-172.pdf.
74
See Alison Grant, Look Out Below: Higher-ups Are Keeping an Eye on
Workers, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 15, 2006, at G1.
75
In re Strack & Van Til, 2004 NLRB LEXIS at *23 (quoting Nat’l Steel &
Shipbuilding, 324 N.L.R.B. at 499).
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Employers might also be said to create an impression of
surveillance by speaking to employees about what they read on employee
blogs. 76 One administrative law judge found an impression of surveillance
when a supervisor told an employee that he “liked her picture” the day after
it was posted on the union’s website, because this “convey[ed] the
impression that he was keeping track of her union activities.” 77 While this
reasoning is superficially appealing, it should rarely be applied. Because
employers are free to visit the site, to forbid them to notify employees that
they read blogs would only foster employee carelessness. Also, if the blog
can be read as a petition to management to change working conditions, then
it is entirely appropriate for management to ask for details about the
concerns expressed, especially if that request is directed towards employees
as a group, rather than towards individuals. Therefore, courts should not
find an unlawful impression of surveillance except in the narrow case when
reasonable employees would infer that their individual protected activities
are being tracked for retaliatory purposes.
In considering the
reasonableness of such an inference, a court would need to look at the
history of the employer’s behavior towards concerted activities, the
individualized nature of the remarks, and the lack of legitimate reasons for
the employer to comment. Given the public nature of the Internet and the
legitimate reasons employers have for monitoring what is written about
them, employer visits to blogs should rarely generate findings of unfair
labor practices.
¶23

B. Employee Blogger’s Duty to Screen Comments
¶24
The comment feature of blogs raises an entirely different set of
issues. One blog may contain writing from people with different agendas,
ethical codes, and levels of self-restraint. Therefore, comments posted to
the blog may cause harm that the original blogger never intended, including
the posting of falsehoods or confidentiality breaches.

Someone who merely posts to a blog in no way inviting criticism of
his employer is probably not engaged in section 7 activity. However, the
employer should normally see no reason to penalize him or her for
¶25

76

Cf. Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914, 914 (2000) (finding an
unlawful impression of surveillance when a supervisor asked two employees
about their conversations with the union organizers who had visited them at the
jobsite earlier that day).
77
Magna Int’l, Inc., No. 7-CA-43093(1), 2001 NLRB LEXIS 134, at *61–*62
(Mar. 9, 2001) (citing Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914 and
Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257, 257 (1993), which explains that “an
employer creates an impression of surveillance by indicating that it is closely
monitoring the degree of an employee's union involvement,” regardless of
whether “the employee intended his involvement to be covert”).
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unsolicited blog comments unless the employee refuses to take down the
objectionable material.
¶26
On the other hand, a blogger who invites criticism of his or her
employer (e.g., by criticizing the employer, debating the employer’s critics,
or asking for others’ opinions of the employer) should foresee that others
will post false accusations or comments that breach confidentiality
agreements. Therefore, such a blogger would be negligent not to pre-screen
comments and should lose protection for those not screened. 78 Moreover,
falsehoods and confidentiality breaches can cause too much harm to allow
the blogger to avoid liability with a mere disclaimer. 79 The problem is that
if the duty to screen comments is too onerous, an employee blogger is likely
to turn off the comment feature or not to blog at all, and the employee
organizing benefits of blogs will be lost. Existing case law, which
considers whether an employee has reason to doubt that information he or
she passes along is false, already balances employers’ interests and
employee speech. 80 Courts should apply this standard to comments that an
employee blogger screens and extend the standard to confidentiality
breaches as well as falsehoods.

C. Employer Blogging Policies
¶27
In response to concerns about inappropriate blog postings, some
employers have created policies to tell employees what is prohibited. 81
While it is obviously reasonable to warn employees not to disclose trade
secrets 82 or confidential financial information83 and to require employees to

78

In the case of confidentiality breaches, a blogger may argue that because he
did not make the original breach of the employer’s confidence, he is not
responsible for the subsequent dissemination of the information. However,
courts should interpret the blogger’s duty of loyalty to prevent him or her from
magnifying the impact of the breach on the employer. For a discussion of the
duty of loyalty, see Lee, supra note 8, ¶¶ 11–23.
79
Cf. Hutchins, supra note 9, at 46 (noting liability for comment content as a
concern for companies that put up their own blogs and suggesting a disclaimer).
80
See discussion supra ¶ 13.
81
See, e.g., EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13–14 & app. (discussing
blog policies from a variety of employers, including Apple and Sun
Microsystems); NewPR Wiki, BloggingPolicy,
http://www.thenewpr.com/wiki/pmwiki.php?pagename=Resources.BloggingPoli
cy (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). For a comparison of several policies, see
Posting of Fredrik Wackå to Corporateblogging.Info,
http://www.corporateblogging.info/2005/06/policies-compared-todayscorporate.asp (June 6, 2005) [hereinafter Wackå].
82
See, e.g., Sun.com, Sun Policy on Public Discourse,
http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/media/blogs/policy.html (last visited Sept. 24,
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post a disclaimer saying that they do not blog on the company’s behalf, 84
not all policies that regulate employee speech are acceptable under the
NLRA. This section will describe the general rules regarding such policies
and then examine a few examples of actual or potential blogging policies.
¶28
In general, promulgating a policy that “would reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights” is an unfair labor
practice. 85 Policies previously ruled unlawful in non-blogging contexts
include “confidentiality” policies that forbid employees from discussing
terms and conditions of employment with each other or customers 86 and
policies forbidding union solicitation in the workplace during non-working
time, even without evidence that employees are unable to communicate
outside of the workplace. 87 Still, particular prohibitions on “profane
language,” 88 “harassment,” 89 and “slanderous or detrimental statements” 90
in the workplace have been upheld on the grounds that a reasonable
employee would see such rules as directed to the employer’s legitimate
concerns, rather than as a bar on protected activity. 91 In Adtranz ABB
Daimler-Benz Transportation, N.A. v. NLRB, 92 the D.C. Circuit held that

2006) (“[I]t’s perfectly OK to talk about your work and have a dialog with the
community, but it’s not OK to publish the recipe for one of our secret sauces.”).
83
See, e.g., id. (“Talking about revenue, future product ship dates, roadmaps, or
our share price is apt to get you, or the company, or both, into legal trouble.”);
see also Wackå, supra note 81.
84
See, e.g., Feedster, Corporate Blogging Policy, (Mar. 7, 2005),
http://feedster.blogs.com/corporate/2005/03/corporate_blogg.html (“Please
make it clear to your readers that the views you express are yours alone and that
they do not necessarily reflect the views of Feedster.”).
85
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1999). Employers also may not enforce a facially valid policy in a
way that discriminates against protected concerted activities. See 1 DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 106 (explaining this for no-solicitation rules).
86
See, e.g., Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1172 (1990)
(“We, therefore, conclude that the judge erred in failing to find that the
Respondent's rule [is an unfair labor practice] because it restricts employees’
Section 7 rights to communicate not only with the employee-parents, but with
all parents.”); King, supra note 36, at 859 (predicting that such policies will also
be prohibited in the Internet context).
87
See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798–99 (1945),
interpreted in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570–71 (1978).
88
Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004–2005 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) ¶16,786, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 664, at *6–*7 (2004).
89
Id. at *14.
90
Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002).
91
Cf. King, supra note 36, at 856 (applying similar logic to confidentiality
policies).
92
253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 17

employers may prohibit “abusive or threatening” language at work, 93 but
acknowledged that discriminatory enforcement of such a policy could be an
unfair labor practice. 94
A company might want to forbid its employees to discuss the
employer on the Internet at all, but this is almost certainly unlawful. 95
Because other means of communication are not nearly equivalent to
blogging, the employer’s rule could easily be described as an “unreasonable
impediment to self-organization” 96 that denies employees “an essential
component of . . . communication.” 97
¶29

¶30
One company’s proposed blogging policy states, “You may not post
any material that is obscene, defamatory, profane, libelous, threatening,
harassing, abusive, hateful or embarrassing to another person
or . . . entity.” 98 This policy has much in common with the one in Adtranz,
except that in Adtranz, the restrictions applied only to the workplace, but
this policy applies to speech outside of work. The balancing of employer
and employee interests is likely to be similar, however, because the policy is
facially neutral towards section 7 activity. Employees can blog about
working conditions without using outrageous language, and employers have
legitimate interests in not having their public image tarnished or the
relationships between their employees damaged by inappropriate material
that employee bloggers post on the Internet. Moreover, a reasonable
employee is likely to understand the rationale for the policy and thus not see
it as a prohibition of protected activity. The only major concern is the word
“embarrassing” because any public criticism of the employer is arguably

93

Id. at 28 (“[T]he Board’s position that the imposition of a broad prophylactic
rule against abusive and threatening language is unlawful on its face is simply
preposterous.”).
94
Id. at 27–28.
95
Apple Computer has been rumored to have such a policy. EDELMAN &
INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13; Think Secret, Inside Apple Retail: Pixel
Policy, Price Matching, Employee Restrictions,
http://www.thinksecret.com/news/0508retail.html (Aug. 5, 2005).
96
See Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1943) (“[I]n the
absence of special circumstances, a rule prohibiting union activity on company
property outside of working time constitutes an unreasonable impediment to
self-organization . . . .”).
97
See Bureau of National Affairs, No. 5-CA-28860, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS
68, at *18–*19 (Oct. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/z100300_bureauofnatio
nal.asp (discussing why the availability of other forms of communication failed
to justify an employer’s ban on email solicitations).
98
Plaxoed!, Plaxo’s Communication (Blogging) Policy,
http://blog.plaxoed.com/?p=41 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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embarrassing. The validity of this particular prohibition is likely to depend
upon whether it is, in fact, applied to prevent section 7 activities.
¶31
Another company, Sun Microsystems, warns employees that “using
your weblog to trash or embarrass the company, our customers, or your coworkers, is not only dangerous but stupid.” 99 Courts examine policy
provisions in their overall context, 100 and this particular remark comes after
a description of the harm the company would suffer if a prospective
customer were to read an employee post saying that a Sun product
“sucks.” 101 Employees complaining about their working conditions could
certainly be seen as “trashing” the company, and the tone of the language is
somewhat threatening, but the example given and the title of the section
(“Think About Consequences”) indicate that Sun is interested in warning
employees not to post thoughtless, “amateurish” remarks. 102 While the
validity of this provision, standing alone, might be a closer call than the
previous two examples, the provision is probably acceptable under the
NLRA when viewed in the context of the overall policy.
¶32
Finally, an employer probably cannot mandate that employees
utilize other channels of communication before blogging, 103 especially
when employees are “legitimately concerned about reprisals,” 104 because
management does not have the prerogative to dictate how concerted activity
will be performed. 105 The existing doctrines that control employer
restrictions on employee communications are thus easily adaptable to the
analysis of blogging policies.

D. Employers Seeking an Anonymous Blogger’s Identity
¶33
Anonymous blogging raises issues that NLRA case law has not yet
addressed thoroughly. Many bloggers and comment posters take more or
less elaborate strategies to conceal their identities, such as pseudonyms,
public computers, proxy servers, or even encrypted email to an anonymous
99

Sun Policy on Public Discourse, supra note 82.
See, e.g., Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002).
(“Employees would not reasonably believe that an expectation that they
represent the Company in a ‘positive and ethical manner,’ in the context of a
prohibition on conflicts of interest, would prohibit Section 7 activity.”).
101
Sun Policy on Public Discourse, supra note 82.
102
Id.
103
Cf. Plaxoed!, supra note 98 (“Voicing concerns about Plaxo publicly without
first communicating such concerns to your management and co-workers is
counterproductive and inadvisable.”).
104
Ogihara Am. Corp., No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555, at *44 (Nov.
3, 2005), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD80-05.pdf.
105
Id. at *47–*48.
100
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hosting company. 106 An employer may sue an anonymous blogger and
subpoena Internet service providers (ISPs) to get the IP address and the
location of the blogger’s computer, 107 but if the lawsuit is groundless, and
the post is protected concerted activity, the suit will be an unfair labor
practice. 108 Also, because filing a lawsuit is time-consuming, expensive,
and possibly ineffective, some employers will likely use strategies such as
surveillance and interrogation to determine bloggers’ identities. Although
an employer may want to know who is raising concerns, the value of
anonymity in allowing employees to communicate without fear of reprisals
should cause courts to view critically the employer’s motivations for
interrogations, lawsuits, and other tactics to uncover bloggers’ identities.
Ogihara America Corp. 109 vividly demonstrates an employer’s
aggressive offline tactics to find the source of an anonymous
communication. In that case, an employer subpoenaed a Kinko’s security
tape to learn the identity of an employee who had sent an anonymous FedEx
on behalf of himself and two co-workers complaining about their
supervisor’s incompetence. 110 The manager’s questioning of employees
regarding the anonymous package was an unfair labor practice because the
questions showed management to be “hostile to” the concerted activity, 111
especially coming “in the midst of a hotly contested union campaign.”112
The employee’s denial that he sent the letter did not justify firing him
because “an employee is under no obligation to respond to questions that
seek to uncover his protected activities.” 113 Similarly, interrogation of
employees and the use of drastic measures to uncover bloggers’ identities
are likely to be unfair labor practices when the posts are protected concerted
¶34

106

See Zuckerman, How to Blog Anonymously, in HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS
supra note 6, at 55, 57–62; see also Electronic Frontier
Foundation, How to Blog Safely (About Work or Anything Else) (Apr. 6, 2005),
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/blog-anonymously.php (describing
Invisiblog.com, Tor, and Anonymizer.com).
107
See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. 2005); Lee,
supra note 8, ¶¶ 30–40; Zuckerman, supra note 106, at 57. Courts balance the
First Amendment protection of anonymous speech against the rights of victims
of defamation, breach of the duty of loyalty, and other torts. See Cahill, 884
A.2d at 461; Lee, supra note 8, ¶¶ 24–35.
108
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 885 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“An employer’s filing or threatened filing of a lawsuit against an employee
concerning union organizing activities may, under certain circumstances, violate
the RLA [Railway Labor Act].”). Note that the RLA is closely analogous to the
NLRA. Strege-Flora, supra note 8, ¶ 7.
109
No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555.
110
Id. at *20–*21.
111
Id. at *61.
112
Id. at *51.
113
Id. at *45.
AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS,
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activity and the court infers a motive to retaliate against those engaged in
protected activities. How courts respond to employer attempts to obtain the
identities of anonymous bloggers will be one of the most interesting
developments in this area of the law.

E. The Structure of the Workplace
¶35
One final idea merits discussion. The NLRB has analyzed the
structure of the individual workplace in recent technology cases, including
general counsel memoranda about employer email and cell phone
policies 114 and a Board decision about whether an employer must furnish a
union with a list of employee email addresses. 115 It might be argued that
courts should also consider the structure of a given workplace when
deciding how vigorously to protect a particular instance of employee
blogging. Obviously, when employees are spread across many locations, or
when they spend little or no time at employer facilities, the Internet may be
the only practicable way for them to communicate. 116 In those cases, the
employee’s interest in section 7 activities is clearly strong relative to the
employer’s interest in avoiding damage to its reputation. In contrast,
employees who work mostly in the same physical location may simply be
114

See, e.g., Banca Di Roma, No. 13-CA-41283-1, 2004 WL 3093490, at *2
(Nov. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/13-CA-41283-1(11-2604).htm (upholding employer ban on cell phones in workplace because
employer’s concern about distractions outweighed employee section 7 concerns
in workplace where employees could often speak to each other in person);
Encompass Servs. Corp., No. 17-CA-20907, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 1, at *6
(Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/s011801_encompass.as
p?bhcp=1 (finding that construction employees who “do not use email or the
Internet to be productive” can be subject to ban on email solicitation); Pratt &
Whitney, No. 12-CA-18446, 1998 WL 1112978, at *2, *4 (Feb. 23, 1998)
(finding that employees’ extensive use of email made the email system a “work
area,” and thus, that employer could not completely forbid non-business emails),
available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/l022398_pratt.asp.
115
See Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1102-03 (2000) (Fox, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “the structural isolation” of customer service
representatives who worked from their homes and cars across eight states made
it necessary to require the employer to give an outside union a list of employee
email addresses).
116
See The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 22-RC-12173, 2002 NLRB LEXIS
551, at *14–*15 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 1, 2002) (describing the
difficulty a union faced in communicating with dispersed potential members);
Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee
Electronic Communication, 105 YALE L.J. 1639, 1657 (1996).
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airing dirty laundry that they could discuss in private to accomplish the
same goals.
¶36
Such a distinction for the structure of the workplace, which would
add yet another layer of complexity to the concerted activity doctrines, is
unnecessary and undesirable. All employees have an interest in a blog’s
ability to reach the public, to archive commentary, and to link to further
resources on the Internet. It would be very difficult to apply a rule
protecting employees’ concerted appeals when they are directed at the
public, but protecting concerted activities directed at other employees only
when the Internet is essential for the communication.

CONCLUSION
Blogs will add a new twist to established concerted activity doctrine
as courts will have to strike the balance between employee and employer
rights. Courts should strongly protect all employee bloggers as they engage
in legitimate concerted activity, but they should also require that bloggers
bear some responsibility in exercising those rights by identifying
themselves as employees and screening comments for obvious falsehoods
and confidentiality breaches. Existing standards of protection against
interference with protected rights often extend readily into the blogging
context. Though highly fact-specific, these standards must be applied
conscientiously to protect employees’ legitimate appeals to the public and
attempts to discuss employment issues, while avoiding unreasonable
restrictions on employers’ needs to monitor what is said about them and
promulgate policies to protect their legitimate business interests.
¶37

